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V.

Most violence is not committed by persons with mental illness . . . . Attempts that aim to prevent events like those that took
place at Columbine and Virginia Tech by focusing on detection
and intervention among persons with severe mental illness will
1
not make society much safer.
Although in the past social scientists and psychiatrists have consistently overestimated their abilities to predict violence and to identify dangerousness, our knowledge may have progressed to the
point that we can now accurately predict violence and identify
2
dangerousness in specific circumstances.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The vast majority of states require that, for purposes of involuntary commitment, an individual must: (1) have a mental illness and
1

Douglas Mossman, The Imperfection of Protection Through Detection and Intervention, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 109, 136 (2009). Mossman further states that “one can give
many solid (and better) reasons for treating mental illness besides reducing violence,
and mental illness contributes to just a small fraction of the violence that Americans
experience.” Id. at 140.
2
John Parry, Involuntary Civil Commitment in the 90s: A Constitutional Perspective, 18
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 320, 321 (1994).
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(2) present an imminent or substantial danger to himself or herself
3
or others. The problem with this standard is that it leaves open the
possibility for non-mentally ill individuals to commit horrific acts of
violence because, without such illness, they would not meet the standard for involuntary commitment. Based upon numerous empirical
studies, mental illness, in and of itself, does not bear a significant
4
causal relationship to violent behavior. In fact, mental illness is only
a causal factor in violent behavior when it is accompanied by and cooccurs with another factor known to have a causal relation to vi5
olence, such as substance abuse.
Furthermore, empirical studies have identified a substantial
amount of environmental and biological factors—such as frontal lobe
disorder and other brain injuries—that are causally related to violent
acts, and it is these and other factors that should be incorporated into
6
modern statutory schemes governing involuntary civil confinement.
Otherwise, individuals that may be biologically prone to violence—or
may become violent based upon environmental factors—can and will
commit acts of violence because there exists no means of intervention
7
or detection before the crime happens.
3

See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.755(a) (West 2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
36-540(A) (2011) (West); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 2010); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 27-65-105(1)(a)(I) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 5010 (West
2010); D.C. CODE § 21-545(b)(2) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(9.1) (West 2010).
4
See JULIO ARBOLEDA-FLÓREZ ET AL., PUB. HEALTH AGENCY OF CAN., MENTAL
ILLNESS AND VIOLENCE: PROOF OR STEREOTYPE? (1996), available at http://www.phacaspc.gc.ca/mh-sm/pubs/mental_illness/index-eng.php; Hon. Cynthia Loo, Predicting
Violence in the Mentally Ill, CRIM. DOCKET (July 2007), http://www.lacba.org/
showpage.cfm?pageid=8032; Drugs and Alcohol, Not Mental Illness, Explains Violent
Crime Risk, U. OXFORD (Sept. 7, 2010), http://www.ox.ac.uk/media/
news_stories/2010/100907.html; John M. Grohol, Dispelling the Myth of Violence and
Mental Illness, PSYCHCENTRAL (June 1998), http://psychcentral.com/archives/
violence.htm; Violence and Mental Illness, CANADIAN MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N,
http://cmha.ca/bins/content_page.asp?cid=3-108 (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
5
Loo, supra note 4.
6
See Dawn J. Post, Preventative Victimization: Assessing Future Dangerousness in Sexual Predators for Purposes of Indeterminate Civil Commitment, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 177, 207–08 (1999) (including a non-exhaustive list of causal factors such as
“age, sex, race, social class, history of alcohol or opiate abuse, educational attainment, . . . residential and employment stability . . . and statistics of violence in the offender’s demographic”).
7
See Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for Violence?, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 332–37 (discussing biological factors that may be causally related to violence). The authors explain as follows:
All behavior is a complex intermingling of nature and nurture. . . . Although most violence is perpetrated by young men against other young
men, violent tendencies can develop prenatally or in early infancy or
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The purpose of this Article is to propose a new standard for involuntary confinement that does not require a finding of mental illness but instead, based upon numerous actuarial assessments, focuses
on determining an individual’s likelihood of engaging in immediate
and foreseeable acts of violence. This new statutory scheme would
allow for the brief detention of potentially dangerous individuals and
thereafter permit a further period of confinement if it is demonstrated that the offender poses a high likelihood of engaging in violent
acts. Unlike most extant statutes, a showing of mental illness would
not be required.
Ultimately, the proposed statute allows for the intervention and
brief detainment of individuals at a much earlier time, for the purpose of preventing the types of horrific tragedies that have occurred
8
9
in our country, from Charles Whitman, to Columbine, to Jonesboro,
10
11
Arkansas, to Red Lake, Minnesota, and to workplace shootings that
12
have occurred across the country . This Article argues that an initial,
and potentially extended, civil commitment can—and should—be
warranted where, by clear and convincing evidence, an individual:
(1) poses an immediate, foreseeable threat to others (the “dangerousness” component); (2) has engaged in at least one overt act of
violence within the past thirty days; and (3) is engaged in behaviors
that are, based upon empirical data and actuarial assessments, causally related to the commission of violent acts. If the brief intervention
can emerge after the onset of puberty. Environmental factors often
play a role. . . . Structural dysfunction may also contribute to violent
behavior. Damage, the decreased metabolizing and uptake of glucose,
reduced blood flow to the frontal lobes, and reduced function have all
been observed in the frontal cortex of violent individuals and murderers. . . . [These injuries are] associated with an increased risk of aggressive and violent behavior.
Id. at 324–29.
8
In 1966, Charles Whitman climbed into a tower at the University of Texas and
shot forty-five people using a sniper rifle. See Gary M. Lavergne‘s A Sniper in the
Tower: The Charles Whitman Murders (1997) for a full account.
9
See infra Part II.A.
10
In 1998, two middle school students opened fire at a middle school killing five
people. See John Kifner, From Wild Talk and Friendship to Five Deaths in a Schoolyard,
N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 1998, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/29/
us/from-wild-talk-and-friendship-to-five-deaths-in-a-schoolyard.html.
11
In 2005, Jeffrey Weise shot and killed his grandfather and his grandfather’s
girlfriend and then drove to his high school where he shot and killed seven people.
See Chris Maag, The Devil in Red Lake, TIME.COM, Mar. 27, 2005,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1042470,00.html?promoid=go
oglep.
12
See Workplace Shootings Fact Sheet, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/osar0014.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
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reveals that an individual poses a grave threat of immediate and/or
foreseeable violence to the community, then further confinement
may be warranted as long as due process standards are carefully and
specifically implemented.
We have the ability, in a manner that comports with due process,
to stop a crime before it happens. Part II will discuss the Columbine
and Virginia Tech massacres and how the involuntary commitment
statutes in these states failed to protect the public from such dangerous individuals. Part II continues by discussing the constitutional due
process standards enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court governing
involuntary confinement. Part III examines the current statutory
schemes regarding involuntary civil confinement and concludes that
these statutes fail to identify many individuals that are likely to engage in serious acts of violence. Part IV sets forth a two-tiered model
statute that allows for the brief, and in some cases extended, detainment of individuals based upon the immediate and foreseeable likelihood that such individuals will engage in violence.
II. THE MASSACRES AT COLUMBINE AND VIRGINIA TECH
Perhaps the most tragic aspect of the Columbine and Virginia
Tech massacres was not only the failure of school officials to heed the
early and imminent warning signs but also the courts’ lack of statutory authority to involuntarily commit these individuals—for an initial
brief period—to assess their level of dangerousness and potential for
violence. The Colorado statute was insufficient to prevent the horrif13
ic Columbine tragedy. Specifically, while the Columbine shooters
certainly posed an imminent threat to others, there was no evidence
that they suffered from a mental illness. In the Virginia Tech tragedy, while the shooter arguably satisfied the statutory standard, it was
determined that outpatient treatment was the proper remedy.
A. Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris
The tragedy at Columbine High School never would have happened if a statute existed in Colorado that allowed for the involuntary
commitment of both Dylan Klebold (“Klebold”) and Eric Harris

13

Id.

See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-65-111(1) (West 2011).
The court or jury shall determine that the respondent is in need of
care and treatment only if the court or jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person has a mental illness and, as a result of the
mental illness, is a danger to others or to himself or herself or is gravely
disabled.
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(“Harris”)—on a short-term basis—to assess their level of dangerousness and potential for violence. The overt acts and explicit threats
made by these individuals established by clear and convincing evidence that, if left untreated, they would engage in a horrific act of violence in the immediate future. Klebold and Harris purchased firearms (including a rifle, semiautomatic pistol, and sawed-off shotguns)
and stored them in their bedrooms in preparation for the ensuing at14
tack at Columbine. Furthermore, Klebold and Harris established a
website whereby they specifically named students that they intended
15
to kill with pipe bombs at the school. They also “made videotapes of
16
themselves shooting their guns and played them in school.” Perhaps most disturbing is the fact that, in February of 1999, Klebold
wrote a story for one of his classes detailing an assassin who “shoots
17
down students and bombs the city.” He further stated that the “man
unload[ed] one of the pistols across the fronts of [the] four innocents . . . [t]he . . . streetlights caused a visible reflection off of the
18
droplets of blood . . . I understood his actions.” Klebold’s teacher de19
scribed the account as “the most vicious story she’d ever read.”
Unfortunately, the administrators at Columbine, along with investigators at the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office, took minimal action to intervene and potentially prevent the horrifying tragedy.
Amazingly, because police had previously investigated Harris’s home
and found a pipe bomb, Columbine administrators “took no action
because certainly they wouldn’t have wanted to interfere with an on20
going investigation.” In addition, Columbine officials were alerted
to the website where Klebold and Harris were threatening to kill sev21
eral students, yet took no action in response. Columbine’s adminis14
Columbine: Were There Warning Signs?, 60 MINUTES (CBS Television Broadcast
April
17,
2001),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/04/17/60II/
main286163.shtml [hereinafter 60 MINUTES].
15
Id.
16
Id
17
Id.
18
Id. (emphasis added).
19
Id.
20
60 MINUTES, supra note 14. A year before the massacre, those in charge of security at Columbine, Joe Schallmoser and Howard Cornell, “were worried that Columbine was just the kind of place where a school shooting might happen.” Id. Consequently, in August of 1998, eight months before the Columbine attack, they “wrote
a security plan that required school officials to notify and meet with parents and law
enforcement as soon as they learned of ‘a threat by any student’ to ‘commit any act
of violence.’” Id. They said that “Columbine didn’t follow the plan.” Id.
21
Id.; see Elise M. Balkin, Comment, Rice v. Paladin: The Fourth Circuit’s Unnecessary
Limiting of a Publisher’s Freedom of Speech, 29 U. BALT. L. REV. 205, 205 (2000); Lynne
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trators never talked to Klebold’s or Harris’s teachers, family, or
friends, and after reading the story by Klebold in which he detailed
22
the murders of four children they again did nothing. On April 20,
1999, Klebold and Harris killed twelve students and one teacher and
23
injured twenty-three others.
B. Seung Hui Cho
Likewise, the Virginia Tech massacre would never have happened had there been a statute permitting the involuntary confinement—for a brief period—of Seung Hui Cho (“Cho”) based upon
the likelihood that he would engage in a violent act in the immediate
or foreseeable future. Instead of focusing on the “dangerousness”
component, the court focused primarily upon Cho’s mental state
24
when making the confinement determination.
Beginning in his
middle school years, Cho behaved in an isolated, withdrawn, inhi25
bited, and non-communicative manner. These behaviors continued
through his high school years, as Cho’s “speech was barely audible
and he did not respond in complete sentences[;] . . . he was not ver26
bally inter-active at all and was shy and shut down.” At the concluMarie Kohm, The Rising Tide of Juvenile Violence: A Natural Disaster for Values-Free Culture, Education and Families?, 1 BARRY L. REV. 109, 109 (2000); Robert D. Richards &
Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free Expression Take Hold in
Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (2003); David Kelly, Columbine Warning Signs
Overlooked, Evidence Shows / Young Killer Had 15 Run-ins with Law Before School Rampage,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2007, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-0227/news/17413812_1_sheriff-john-stone-sheriff-ted-mink-eric-harris; John Sarche,
Documentary Outlines Columbine Killers’ Warning Signs, BERKLEY DAILY PLANET, Mar. 30,
2002,
available
http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2002-03-30/article/
11066?headline=Documentary-outlines-Columbine-killers-warning-signs; see also Sarah E. Redfield, Threats Made, Threats Posed: School and Judicial Analysis in Need of Redirection, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 663 (2003) (discussing the need for courts to establish
a set of threat assessment factors in the school context); Richard Salgado, Comment,
Protecting Student Speech Rights While Increasing School Safety: School Jurisdiction and the
Search for Warning Signs in a Post-Columbine/Red Lake Environment, 2005 BYU L. REV.
1371 (2005) (discussing the line between student speech rights and educators’ needs
for secure school environment); Scott R. Simpson, Comment, Report Card: Grading the
Country’s Response to Columbine, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 415 (2005) (discussing federal and
state legislation regarding school violence and recommending a grass roots approach
to solve the problem).
22
See 60 MINUTES, supra note 14.
23
Regina Avila, Judi Acre & Jan Torpy, Columbine Timeline, DENV. POST, Apr. 16,
2000, http://extras.denverpost.com/news/timeline.htm.
24
See VA. TECH REV. PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 47–48 (2007),
available
at
http://www.governor.virginia.gov/tempcontent/techPanelReportdocs/FullReport.pdf.
25
Id. at 1, 35.
26
Id. at 36.
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sion of his high school career, counselors determined that Cho suf27
fered from depression and social anxiety disorder.
It was at Virginia Tech, however, that Cho began to exhibit the
early and imminent warning signs of dangerousness both to himself
and others. To begin with, in the fall of 2005, Cho went to a dormitory party, unexpectedly brandished a knife, and proceeded to re28
peatedly stab the carpet. He also produced a paper in one of his
classes in which he criticized his classmates for consuming meat, stating, “[y]ou low-life barbarians make me sick to my stomach. I hope
y’all burn in hell for mass murdering and eating all those little ani29
mals.”
Cho’s dangerous behavior then began to escalate. He was found
30
with a very large knife in his desk. After further bizarre behaviors,
which included sending strange emails to a female student, the Virginia Tech police intervened and took him into custody for an initial
31
evaluation. The pre-screener found that Cho suffered from a mental illness, was a danger to himself or others, and required in-patient
32
hospitalization. Critically, however, at a subsequent hearing where
an independent psychologist evaluated Cho, the pre-screener’s find33
ings were overruled.
The attending psychiatrist instead found that “Cho ‘is mentally
ill; that he does not present an imminent danger to (himself/others), or is not
substantially unable to care for himself, as a result of mental illness;
34
and that he does not require involuntary hospitalization.’”
Ultimately, and in what represents the cornerstone of this Article, the
Court found that, while “Cho ‘presents an imminent danger to himself as a result of mental illness,’” only outpatient treatment was re35
36
quired. Cho was subsequently discharged. The Court had the authority to detain Cho yet let him go. If Virginia had a statute
requiring the in-patient detainment of Cho based upon the fact that
he was an imminent danger to himself or others—regardless of mental illness—the Virginia Tech tragedy may never have happened.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 39.
Id. at 42.
Id.
VA. TECH REV. PANEL,, supra note 24, at 45.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. (quoting the independent evaluator) (emphasis added).
Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
VA. TECH REV. PANEL, supra note 24, at 49.
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Following this hearing, Cho continued his bizarre behavior, including writing very violent stories and remaining non37
communicative in class. One student remarked that Cho “was the
38
kind of guy who might go on a rampage killing.” Indeed, in the fall
39
of 2007, Cho “began to purchase guns and ammunition.” The “red
flags” were so apparent that Cho should have been, but was not, subject to involuntary confinement. Multiple sources “expressed [concern] over Cho’s behavior in the dorm,” but this was not brought to
40
the attention of the school’s Care Team. Various faculty members
“spoke up loudly about a sullen, foreboding male student who refused to talk, frightened classmates and faculty with macabre writings,
41
and refused faculty exhortations to get counseling.”
On April 16, 2007, Cho killed thirty-two students and injured
42
approximately thirty others before killing himself, confirming the
psychiatrist’s determination that he presented an imminent threat to
43
himself and others.

37

Id. at 49.
Id. at 51.
39
Id. at 52.
40
Id. “The Care Team at Virginia Tech was established as a means of identifying
and working with students who have problems.” Id.
41
Id.
42
See Alison Pfeffer, “Imminent Danger” and Inconsistency: The Need for National
Reform of the “Imminent Danger” Standard for Involuntary Civil Commitment in the Wake of
the Virginia Tech Tragedy, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 277, 277 (2008). Pfeffer criticizes the
“imminent danger” standard, arguing as follows:
The real danger at hand is the effect of such a narrow threshold on
involuntary civil commitment. While it may give individuals extensive
rights, it sacrifices the needs of the mentally ill individuals who do not
qualify and must suffer without treatment. Individuals who are too
mentally ill to recognize that they are in need of treatment or refuse to
consent to treatment cannot be involuntarily committed until their
condition has become significantly worse and treatment may be less
successful. In this sense, the ‘imminent danger’ standard is unbalanced because it preserves individual autonomy but severely undermines traditional theories of state power to care for and protect the
mentally ill and society. . . . [Furthermore,] [a] lower threshold for involuntary civil commitment is associated with lower incarceration rates
and higher commitment rates due to increased exercise of parens patriae power rather than police power.
Id. at 297–99.
43
VA. TECH REV. PANEL, supra note 24, at 47; see also Katrina Chapman, A Preventable Strategy at Virginia Tech: Why Confusion over FERPA’s Provisions Prevents Schools from
Addressing Student Violence, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 349, 349 (2009).
38
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C. The Constitutional Requirements for Involuntary
In-Patient Confinement
This Article proposes a new standard governing the involuntary,
in-patient civil confinement of dangerous individuals in such a way
that: (1) comports with existing constitutional standards and (2) provides for the early detection and intervention of those individuals
likely to engage in immediate and foreseeable acts of violence. Before reviewing the extant statutes governing involuntary confinement,
it is necessary to examine the current constitutional framework within
which such statutes must operate.
1.

The Federal Level

In O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Supreme Court notes that involun44
tary civil commitment implicates important due process concerns.
Specifically, involuntary commitment “must be justified on the basis
of a legitimate state interest, and the reasons for committing a partic45
ular individual must be established in an appropriate proceeding.”
Furthermore, a “finding of ‘mental illness’ alone cannot justify a
State’s locking a person up against his will and keeping him . . . in
46
simple custodial confinement.” This is particularly true where such
an individual “is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or
47
with the help of family and friends.” Moreover, in Jackson v. Indiana,
the Court stated that “due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
48
which the individual is committed.” Involuntarily committed individuals retain a “liberty interest” and are thus entitled to safe condi44

O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1975); id. at 580 (Burger, J.,
concurring).
45
Id. at 580 (Burger, J., concurring); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491–93
(1980).
46
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. The O’Connor Court further held as follows:
The fact that state law may have authorized confinement of the harmless mentally ill does not itself establish a constitutionally adequate
purpose for the confinement. . . .
. . . That the State has a proper interest in providing care and assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere presence
of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home
to the comforts of an institution. . . .
. . . One might as well as if the State, to avoid public unease, could
incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric.
Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the
deprivation of a person’s physical liberty.
Id. at 574–75 (internal citations omitted).
47
Id. at 576.
48
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
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tions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint,
49
and, at a minimum, procedures designed to protect those interests.
Furthermore, in Zinermon v. Birch, the Court found that an individual
must be “dangerous” to warrant involuntary confinement, holding
that “the involuntary placement process serves to guard against the
50
confinement of a person who, though mentally ill, is harmless.”
Additionally, an individual cannot be committed as a “voluntary” pa51
tient if he does not have the capacity to give informed consent.
In Addington v. Texas, the Court held that, for purposes of involuntary confinement, the State must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that an individual has a mental illness that renders
52
him a danger to himself or others. The Court clarified this standard
in Kansas v. Hendricks, stating that “[a] finding of dangerousness
alone is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify inde53
finite involuntary commitment.”
Critically, however, the Court
noted that “[w]e have sustained civil commitment statutes when they
have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional
54
factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’” The Hendricks Court never required the States to incorporate mental illness
within their involuntary commitment statutes. It only required the
existence of some “additional factor,” which is precisely the focus of

49
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16, 319 (1982). The Youngberg Court
explained that “the right to personal security constitutes a ‘historic liberty interest’
protected substantively by the due process clause . . . [a]nd that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes.” Id. at 315.
50
Zinerman v. Birch, 494 U.S. 113, 133–34 (1990). Specifically, the Court held
that “[p]ersons who are mentally ill and incapable of giving informed consent to
admission would not necessarily meet the standard for involuntary placement, which
requires either that they are likely to injure themselves or others, or that their neglect or refusal to care for themselves threatens their well-being.” Id. at 133.
51
Id.; cf. Washington v. Silber, 805 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. Va. 1992) (holding that an
involuntarily committed patient could be forced to take antipsychotic drugs against
his will, in light of the fact that the patient was substantially unable to care for himself, and there were no less restrictive alternative to involuntary confinement).
52
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 419, 432–33 (1979).
53
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (emphasis added).
54
Id. (emphasis added); see also Jennifer Honig & Susan Stefan, New Law, Policy,
and Medicine of Involuntary Treatment: A Comprehensive Case Problem Approach to Criminal
and Civil Aspect Outpatient Commitment Debate, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 139, 139 (2005) (reiterating that proof of dangerousness must be accompanied by an additional factor, thus implying that mental illness is not a required
component of involuntary commitment). But see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71
(1992) (holding in a 5–4 ruling that an insanity acquittee, whose mental illness had
been successfully treated, cannot be subject to continued confinement solely on the
basis that he is a danger to the community).

LAMPARELLO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6/16/2011 1:45 PM

886

[Vol. 41:875

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
55

the proposed statute. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane are notable because they upheld a statute in Kansas that authorized the involuntary
commitment of sexual offenders after completion of their sentence,
provided that such individuals were found to be suffering from: (1) a
56
mental abnormality or defect and (2) lacked volitional control.
Federal district courts, however, have eviscerated the “dangerousness” component of involuntary commitment by holding that an
individual need not engage in an overt act of violence to be involuntarily committed. For example, in Covell v. Smith, the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that “[a] finding of
57
‘dangerousness’ does not require an overt act by the individual.”
Likewise, in Burruel v. Spurgeon, in rejecting petitioner’s habeas claim,
the court held that “there is no clearly established Supreme Court law
requiring proof of a ‘recent overt act’ to support a civil commit58
ment.”
2.

The State Court Level

Decisions at the state court level have also impacted the nature
and scope governing involuntary confinement. For example, in In re
Commitment of Dennis H., the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the
claim that, for purposes of involuntary commitment, an individual
59
must present an imminent threat of physical harm. Instead, the court
55
521 U.S. 346 (1997) (making the ruling dependent upon its determination
that the statute was non-punitive in nature); see also David Cole, Out of the Shadows:
Preventative Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 710–11 (2009)
(discussing general principles governing in-patient confinement).
56
Crane, 521 U.S. at 356–57; see also In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109
(2002) (upholding a virtually identical statute in New Jersey).
57
No. 95-501, 1996 WL 750033, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1996) (emphasis added).
58
No. ED CV O7-1131-AG(E), 2008 WL 624752, at *6, *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008)
(noting that the Supreme Court has “not specifically defined the dangerousness
element of the . . . substantive due process standard.”) (citation omitted).
59
In re Commitment of Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d 851, 862 (Wis. 2002). In so holding, the Court stated as follows:
It is well-established that the state “cannot constitutionally confine
without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
family members or friends.” This does not mean, however, that substantive due process requires the state to restrict the scope of its mental
health commitment statutes to only those individuals who are imminently physically dangerous. There is no “single definition that must
be used as the mental condition sufficient for involuntary mental
commitments.” In this complicated and difficult area, the Supreme
Court “has wisely left the job of creating statutory definitions to the legislators who draft state laws.
Id. at 862–63 (citations omitted).
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held that “substantive due process has not been held to require proof
of imminent physical dangerousness to self or others as a necessary
60
prerequisite to involuntary commitment.” In so holding, the court
found constitutional a section of Wisconsin’s involuntary commitment statute that required only a “substantial probability” that an individual may engage in acts of violence due to loss of volitional con61
62
trol. Similarly, in In re Albright, the Kansas Court of Appeals held
that a finding of “imminency” was not required to justify involuntary
confinement, holding that such commitment “merely ‘requires a
showing that the potential for doing harm is great enough to justify such
63
a massive curtailment of liberty.’” In accepting this lower threshold
determination for violence, the court referred to other decisional
law, where the imminency standard was replaced by “a serious threat
64
to himself or others,” a “likelihood of inflicting serious harm on
65
himself or on others,” or “a serious threat of substantial harm to
66
themselves or others.”
Furthermore, in In re A.S.B., the Montana Supreme Court issued
a monumental decision, holding that involuntary commitment was
justified where the plaintiff’s mental illness, if untreated, may deteri67
orate to such a point where he becomes a threat to public safety.
Thus, based upon relevant decisional law, if there is an individual suffering from a mental illness that poses a “potential” for violence—yet
has not exhibited any actions manifesting violent behavior—then he
68
or she could be subject to civil confinement.

60

Id. at 862.
Id. at 859.
62
In re Albright, 836 P.2d 1 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992).
63
Id. at 4 (quoting In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1982)) (emphasis added).
64
Id. (quoting Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F.Supp. 439, 451 (S.D. Iowa 1976)).
65
Id. (quoting Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.Supp. 378, 391(M.D. Ala. 1974)).
66
Id. (quoting Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.Supp. 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975) (emphasis added)). But see Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 421
U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F.Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976)) (“the proper standard
[for involuntary commitment] is that which requires a finding of imminent and substantial danger as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat.”).
67
See In re Mental Health of A.S.B., 180 P.3d 625, 630 (Mont. 2008).
68
See, e.g., Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975); Hatcher v.
Wachtel, 269 S.E.2d 849 (W.Va. 1980); In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1982); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F.Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976). But see Reome v. Levine, 692 F.
Supp. 1046 (D. Minn. 1988) (holding that confinement of an individual based upon
dangerousness alone was insufficient where the patient was not mentally ill).
61
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III. THE LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS GOVERNING INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT AND THEIR FAILURE TO IDENTIFY
THE MOST DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS
In light of relevant decisional law, every state has drafted its own
statutes governing involuntary commitment. The problem is that
nearly every state statute includes factors that: (1) are not constitutionally required by relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence and (2)
fail to identify the most dangerous individuals because of the “mental
illness” requirement. Although the states have correctly included the
“dangerousness” element in their statutes, they have incorrectly required the presence of a mental illness, which is, based upon empirical data, not in and of itself a causal factor in violence.
These statutes assume that dangerous individuals must suffer
from a mental disorder and that is simply incorrect. To make matters
worse, the relevant statutes do not require, as discussed in Part IV, the
showing of the most relevant early and imminent warning signs of violence that should accompany the “dangerousness” calculus. As a result, a dangerous but not-mentally ill individual can, in nearly every
state, engage in acts of horrific violence because he or she is not eligible for involuntary commitment. We must wait until the crime happens, rather than prevent it through early intervention. A sample of
current statutes is demonstrative of this approach.
A. Relevant State Statutes Governing Involuntary Confinement:
The Wrong Emphasis on Mental Illness
This section will (1) begin by surveying several statutes that are
representative of and consistent with those in all states, in that they
require a showing of mental illness for purposes of in-patient treatment, and (2) proceed to demonstrate that mental illness, in and of
itself, is not a causal factor in violent behavior.
1.

Alabama

Alabama Code section 22-52-10.4 provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) A respondent may be committed to in-patient treatment if the
probate court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence
that: (i) the respondent is mentally ill; (ii) as a result of the mental illness the respondent poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to self and/or others; (iii) the respondent will, if
not treated, continue to suffer mental distress and will continue
to experience deterioration of the ability to function independently; and (iv) the respondent is unable to make a rational and
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informed decision as to whether or not treatment for mental ill69
ness would be desirable.

2.

Arkansas

Arkansas Code Annotated section 20-47-207(c) provides in relevant part as follows: “A person shall be eligible for involuntary admission if he or she is in such mental condition as a result of mental illness, disease, or disorder that he or she poses a clear and present
70
danger to himself or herself or others.”
3.

Connecticut

Connecticut General Statute section 17a-498(c) provides as follows:
If, on such hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person complained of has psychiatric disabilities
and is dangerous to himself or herself or others or gravely disabled, it shall make an order for his or her commitment, considering whether or not a less restrictive placement is available, to a
hospital for psychiatric disabilities to be named in such order,
there to be confined for the period of the duration of such psychiatric disabilities or until he or she is discharged or converted
to voluntary status pursuant to section 17a-506 in due course of
71
law.

4.

Florida

Florida Statute Annotated section 394.467(1) provides in relevant part as follows:
A person may be placed in involuntary inpatient placement for
treatment upon a finding of the court by clear and convincing
evidence that:
(a) He or she is mentally ill and because of his or her mental illness:
1. (a) He or she has refused voluntary placement for
treatment after sufficient and conscientious explanation and disclosure of the purpose of placement
for treatment; or
(b) He or she is unable to determine for himself or
herself whether placement is necessary; and
2. (a) He or she is manifestly incapable of surviving
alone or with the help of willing and responsible

69
70
71

ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4(a) (LexisNexis 2011).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207(c) (West 2011).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-498(c) (West 2011).
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family or friends . . . and, without treatment, is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself, and such neglect or refusal poses a
real and present threat of substantial harm to his or
her well-being; or
(b) There is substantial likelihood that in the near
future he or she will inflict serious bodily harm on
himself or herself or another person, as evidenced
by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threat72
ening such harm.

5.

Illinois

Finally, Illinois Compiled Statute chapter 405, section 5/1-119
provides as follows:
Persons subject to involuntary admission . . . means:
(1) A person with mental illness who because of his or her
illness is reasonably expected . . . to engage in conduct
placing such person or another in physical harm or in
reasonable expectation of being physically harmed;
(2) A person with mental illness and who because of his or
her illness is unable to provide for his basic physical
needs so as to guard himself or herself from serious
harm without the assistance of family or others . . .; or
(3) A person with mental illness who: (i) refuses treatment
or is not adhering adequately to prescribed treatment;
(ii) because of the nature of his or her illness, is unable to understand his or her need for treatment; and
(iii) if not treated on an inpatient basis, is reasonably
expected, based on his or her behavioral history, to
suffer mental or emotional deterioration and is reasonably expected, after such deterioration, to meet the
criteria of either paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of
73
this Section.

Each of the above statutes are consistent with and representative
74
of enactments across the country, which nearly all require the exis72

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1) (West 2011).
405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-119 (West 2011).
74
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.755(a) (West 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
36-540(A) (2011); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-10-102(5) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5010 (2011); D.C. CODE § 21545(b) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(9.1) (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.2 (West
2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-329(11) (2011); IND. CODE ANN. §12-26-7-5(a) (West
2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1(16) (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f) (West
2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(E)(1)
(2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3864(6)(a) (2010); MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH73
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tence of a mental illness as a prerequisite to involuntary confine75
ment. As one commentator noted, “courts tend to regard the severity and type of symptoms of an individual’s mental illness, including
self-destructive behavior, as indicative of whether involuntary com76
mitment is warranted.” As described below, however, mental illness
alone does not bear a significant causal relationship to dangerous
77
behavior. Thus, those individuals who are extremely—and imminently—dangerous (but not mentally ill) are not subject to confinement and remain a grave threat to the community.
B. Mental Illness and Violence: The Lack of a Significant
Causal Link
The fatal infirmity in most states’ statutory schemes is that they
require a showing of mental illness before an individual is eligible for
involuntary confinement. This requirement undermines the very
purpose of involuntary commitment statutes because it allows dangerous but non-mentally ill individuals to remain free of early detection and intervention efforts. This is exacerbated by the lack of a
causal relationship between mental illness and violent behavior.
As one commentator has explained, “[m]ost violence is not
committed by persons with mental illness; [for example,] studies sugGEN. §10-632(e)(2) (LexisNexis 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § (8)(a) (West
2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
253B.09(1) (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(4) (2011); MO. ANN. STAT. §
632.350(5) (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(1) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 71-925(1) (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.310(1) (LexisNexis 2011);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:34 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(m) (West 2011);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §43-1-11(c) (West 2010); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.05(b), 9.37(a)
(McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268(j) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.107 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(C) (LexisNexis 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43A § 1-103(13)(a) (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.005(1)(d) (West 2011); 50
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-8(j) (2010); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-1-2 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 33-6-501 (2010); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034 (West 2009); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 62A-15-631(10) (LexisNexis 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7101(17)
(2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817.C (2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.240 (West
2011); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(j) (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.20(1)(a)(1),
51.20(1)(a)(2) (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. §25-10-110(j) (2010); see also TREATMENT
ADVOCACY CENTER, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org (last visited Mar. 29,
2011).
75
See Elizabeth A. McGuan, New Standards for the Involuntary Confinement of the
Mentally Ill: Danger Redefined, 11 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 181, 200–06 (2009) (discussing the definition of “dangerousness” and how it has been defined differently among
the states, from the threat of “imminent harm” or “substantial likelihood” of engaging in violent behavior).
76
Pfeffer, supra note 42, at 295.
77
See supra Part II.
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gest that individuals with schizophrenia account for only 5% of the
78
violence that occurs society wide.”
Accordingly, “[a]ttempts that
aim to prevent events like those that took place at Columbine and
Virginia Tech by focusing on detection and intervention among per79
sons with severe mental illness will not make society much safer.”
Indeed, one study found that “[a]pproximately 90 percent of people
80
with mental disorders are in no way violent or dangerous.” Another
report that observed patients with mental disorders one year after
discharge from hospitalization concluded that “no significant difference [exists] between the prevalence of violence by patients without
symptoms of substance abuse and the prevalence of violence by others living in the same neighborhoods who were also without symp81
toms of substance abuse.” Rather, “[t]he mentally ill may in fact be
more likely to withdraw or harm themselves than to act aggressively
82
toward others.” Thus, mental illness does not bear a causal relationship to violent behavior unless it is accompanied by a diagnosis of
83
substance abuse.
These findings were underscored by a study at the University of
Oxford, which found that mental illness is only predictive of violence
when there exists a co-occurring disorder such as drug or alcohol
84
abuse. With respect to bi-polar disorder and schizophrenia, the report stated that
the overrepresentation of individuals with bi-polar disorder in violent crime statistics is almost entirely attributable to concurrent
drug or alcohol abuse. . . . “In people without substance abuse
problems, bi-polar disorder is not a problem for violent crime. . . .
This shows we need to focus our attention on how we can detect
those individuals with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia with

78

Mossman, supra note 1, at 136.
Id.; see also Caroline M. Mee & Harold V. Hall, Risky Business: Assessing Dangerousness in Hawai’i, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 63, 108–12 (2001) (discussing the various factors that contribute to violent behavior).
80
Loo, supra note 4 (citing Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: Evidence from the Epidemiological Catchment Area Surveys, 41
HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 761 (1990)).
81
Henry J. Steadman et al.. Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCHIATRY
393, 393 (1998).
82
Loo, supra note 4 (citing Marc Hillbrand et al., Clinical Predictors of SelfMutilation in Hospitalized Patients, 182 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 9 (1994).
83
See Steadman, supra note 81, at 393.
84
See Drugs and Alcohol, Not Mental Illness, Explains Violent Behavior, UNIVERSITY OF
OXFORD
(Sept.
07.
2010),
http://www.ox.ac.uk/media/news_stories/
2010/100907.html.
79
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substance abuse problems, and prevent and treat those who are abus85
ing substances.”

Mental illness alone does not bear a causal relationship to the commission of violent acts. As one psychologist explains:
It’s time that . . . we begin to knock down stereotypes and start
breaking down the stigma associated with mental disorders. The
first stereotype to go down—permanently, we hope—is that
people who suffer from depression, anxiety, schizophrenia, an
eating disorder, or any other type of mental disorder, are somehow more violent than others. This simply isn’t true, unless they
are involved in substance abuse. Use and abuse of substances
such as drugs or alcohol is often correlated with an increase in violence anyway . . . . Violence is most often a criminal activity
which has little correlation with a person’s mental health. Most
people who suffer from a mental disorder are not violent—there
86
is no need to fear them.

Thus, “people with a mental illness . . . are no more likely than any87
one else to harm strangers.”
These findings are congruous with numerous empirical studies,
including a comprehensive study titled “Mental Illness and Violence:
Proof or Stereotype,” which confirms that mental illness does not
88
bear a causal relationship to violent conduct.
In this study, researchers found that “there is no consistent evidence to support the
hypothesis that mental illness . . . that is uncomplicated by substance
abuse[,] is a significant risk factor for violence or criminality, once
89
past history of violence is controlled.” The study also found that
“[i]t is unlikely that a member of the public would be at risk of vi90
olence from someone with a non-substance abuse disorder.” Additionally, “[p]ersons with mental illnesses are no more likely to be
charged with a violent crime than those who do not have a mental
91
illness.” Consequently, based upon the data considered in the study,

85

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Dr. Seena Fazel of the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Oxford).
86
Grohol, supra note 4.
87
Violence and Mental Illness, CAN. MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, http://cmha.ca/bins/
content_page.asp?cid=3-108 (last visited March 13, 2011).
88
ARBOLEDA-FLÓREZ ET AL., supra note 4.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
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the researchers concluded “there is no compelling scientific evidence to
92
suggest that mental illness causes violence.”
Rather, individuals suffering from mental disorders are more
likely to be the victims, rather than perpetrators, of violent crime.
For example, existing research “shows that people with major mental
illnesses are 2.5 times more likely to be the victims of violence rather
93
than other members of society.” Another study found that “persons
with severe mental illness are victims of violent crime in the course of
a year . . . [a]t a rate 11 times higher than that of the general popula94
tion.” Specifically, “[p]eople with mental illnesses were eight times
more likely to be robbed, 15 times more likely to be assaulted, and 23
95
times more likely to be raped than was the general population.” As
one commentator explains, “[t]he direction of causality is the reverse
of common belief: persons who are seriously mentally ill are far more
96
likely to be the victims of violence than its initiators.” The reasons
supporting this conclusion are attributable, in part, to “minimal family or community support, low socioeconomic status, social stress, so97
cial isolation, poor self-esteem and personality problems.”
Ultimately, the extant statutes governing involuntary confinement make it more, rather than less, difficult to identify those individuals that are most likely to engage in violent conduct. Indeed, individuals who pose the greatest risk for violence are not mentally ill;
instead, they are, among other things, substance abusers. Thus, by
requiring a showing that a person suffers from a cognizable mental
illness as a prerequisite to involuntary confinement, we are not only
narrowing the class of individuals subject to confinement, but we are
also incorrectly identifying those most at risk for engaging in acts of
violence. This is particularly troubling because involuntary commitment statutes are not only designed to treat people with mental illnesses, but they are intended to protect the community from those
92
Id.; see also Kristina M. Campbell, Blurring the Lines of the Danger Zone: The Impact
of Kendra’s Law on the Rights of the Nonviolent Mentally Ill, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 173, 176 (2002) (stating that, in New York, involuntary outpatient commitment laws do not require a showing of dangerousness); Jessica L. MacKeigan, Violence, Fear and Jason’s Law: The Needless Expansion of Social Control over the NonDangerous Mentally Ill in Ohio, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739, 749 (2008) (discussing a proposed law in Ohio that would allow for the forced outpatient treatment of mentally
ill individuals without any significant finding of dangerousness).
93
Violence and Mental Illness, supra note 87.
94
Aaron Levin, People with Mental Illness are More Often Crime Victims, PSYCHIATRIC
NEWS (Sept. 2, 2005), http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/content/40/17/16.full.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Violence and Mental Illness, supra note 87.
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most at risk for engaging in violent behavior. The current statutes do
just the opposite—they exclude from confinement the vast majority
of individuals who, based upon a number of factors not remotely related to mental illness, are likely to engage in violent criminal conduct.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never required that a person be mentally ill before involuntary commitment is warranted. Instead, in Kansas v. Crane, the Court said that a finding of dangerous98
ness must be accompanied by an “additional” factor or factors, and
those “additional” factors, this Article submits, should be variables
most likely to predict, based upon actuarial assessments and other data, whether a particular individual is highly likely to engage in criminal conduct. The involuntary commitment statutes have it backwards—they over-emphasize mental illness and under-emphasize
dangerousness. It should be the reverse, which is precisely what the
proposed statute in this Article endeavors to accomplish. Stated
simply, involuntary commitment statutes should be revised to focus
upon the “dangerousness” component, and such statutes should
enunciate multi-factorial elements related to the dangerousness
component that must be satisfied, such as an overt act of violence, in
order to warrant confinement. Of course, under such a revised statute, individuals who suffer from mental illnesses will still be subject
to confinement if they are dangerous, but the requisite causal relationship between mental illness and violence will not be required. In
essence, the statute will broaden the scope of those subject to confinement, thus promoting greater treatment and public safety.
IV. THE PROPOSED STATUTE GOVERNING INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT: FOCUSING ON IMMEDIATE AND FORESEEABLE
DANGEROUSNESS
The proposed statute strives to reverse, for purposes of involuntary commitment, the emphasis from those who are mentally ill to
those who pose an immediate, significant, and foreseeable threat to
the community. In this way, the proposed statute will broaden the
class of individuals who may be subject to involuntary confinement by
including dangerous but non-mentally ill individuals. Importantly,
however, the statute is not punitive. Instead, it is designed, should
involuntary confinement be deemed necessary, to provide effective
treatment for an individual (rehabilitation), while also seeking to
promote greater public safety (utilitarianism). In so doing, both the
98

521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
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substantive and procedural due process rights of the patient will be
strictly protected, and the confinement will be conducted in a safe
manner that seeks to ensure effective treatment in the shortest possible timeframe.
A. The Proposed Statute, the Early Intervention and Prevention Act
(EIPA): Procedures Governing the Confinement of Individuals
Likely to Engage in Immediate and/or Foreseeable Acts of Violence
1.

EIPA Statement of Purpose

The purpose of the proposed statute, the Early Intervention and
Prevention Act (EIPA), is to identify those individuals who pose a
grave threat to engage in violent conduct towards themselves or others in the immediate or foreseeable future. Importantly, this statute
does not require a finding of “mental illness” as a prerequisite to involuntary confinement because empirical data has demonstrated that
mental illness, in and of itself, is not a substantial causal factor in violent behavior.
The statute is neither punitive nor retributive in nature; rather it
seeks to provide effective treatment for those individuals whose circumstances and prior experiences render them likely to engage in
violent acts in the immediate and foreseeable future. More specifically, the statutory language and procedures adopted therewith are intended to comply with an individual’s liberty interests and procedural
and substantive due process safeguards. For example, as set forth below, any individual committed under this statute shall have the right
to a safe environment in which an individualized treatment plan is
adopted to address the individual’s particular needs and characteristics. Such treatment shall be conducted in a manner that is designed
to ensure a successful outcome in the shortest time possible and
through the least restrictive means available.
Additionally, the court within the respective jurisdiction where
involuntary confinement is conducted shall serve to oversee and ensure that the administration and implementation of any treatment is
conducted in a manner that relates to the specific purposes justifying
the initial confinement. The court shall have other oversight duties,
including: determining why continued confinement and treatment is
necessary; whether treatment is being properly administered consistent with the States’ initial treatment framework; setting forth particular intervals within which the State must report to the court regarding the efficacy of the treatment; and ultimately placing a time-limit
upon which the individual may be confined, regardless of whether
treatment is successful. The burden shall be on the State to justify in-

LAMPARELLO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

WHY WAIT UNTIL CRIME HAPPENS?

6/16/2011 1:45 PM

897

itial and continued confinement, and the defendant will have, at all
times, the ability to contest this justification and seek immediate release.
The EIPA has the primary purpose of increasing public safety by
treating those individuals who represent the greatest threat of engaging in violent behavior. This statute also assumes that individuals who
are prone to immediate and foreseeable violence can successfully be
treated in a manner that substantially reduces, if not eliminates, this
proclivity, and thus improves the individual’s quality of life and reduces crime in the particular community where such individual resides.
2.

EIPA Definitions

As set forth in the statutory language, the following definitions
shall apply:
“Immediate threat of harm” refers to the level of danger posed
by the particular individual for whom the State seeks confinement.
“Immediate” does not necessarily mean “imminent,” in that the harm
sought to be prevented is predicted to occur in a matter of hours or
specified period of time. This interpretation would be impractical
and unworkable because it is simply unpredictable. The term “immediate” shall instead be construed to mean that the threat is reasonably likely to occur in the near, rather than distant, future, to such
an extent that those individuals—such as family, friends, co-workers
and others associated with the individual—believe that there is a high
likelihood that the individual will, in a matter of days, even weeks,
engage in an act of violence against either himself or herself or others. There is no specific formula or criteria to determine whether the
likelihood for violence is “immediate,” although it does require that
its potential be real, substantial, and likely to occur within a short
time period.
“Foreseeable threat of harm” shall be construed to mean that,
based upon an individual’s recent behavior, overt acts, and interactions with others, it is reasonably likely that an act of violence will be a
reasonably likely consequence of, or bear a causal relationship to,
that individual’s recent behavior, overt acts, and interactions with
others. The term “foreseeable” does not—and should not—be construed as a qualification on the term “immediate.” Rather, it must be
reasonably foreseeable, in the immediate future, that the individual’s
potential for violence is likely to result from his or her preceding actions.
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“Overt Act of Violence” shall be construed to mean that an individual has engaged in an act of violence to himself or herself, towards
others, or to property. The overt act shall not be limited to acts of
physical violence but shall include verbal threats, acts of intimidation,
and other behaviors that are intended to place, or result in placing,
others in fear of bodily harm.
“Direct or Substantial Cause of Violent Behavior” shall be construed to mean that an individual is engaged in behaviors that predict
or indicate that such individual is reasonably likely to engage in an
act or acts of violence in the immediate or foreseeable future. The
determination of whether an individual engages in behaviors causally
related to violent behavior depends upon the administration of actuarial assessments, such as the Historical Clinical Risk-20 (HCR-20),
Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R), Level of Service Inventory, and Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), which contain numerous factors, based upon prior research, that accurately predict
99
whether a person is reasonably likely to engage in violent behavior.
These and other tools shall be used in determining whether an individual poses an immediate and/or foreseeable threat of harm to him100
self or herself or others.

99
See, e.g., David P. Farrington, Predictors, Causes and Correlates of Male Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 421, 432–42 (1998) (listing and examining factors that cause
violence in young males); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting
Harm Among Prisoners, Predators and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 409–26 (2006) (discussing the various factors that lead to violent behavior); Brian Netter, Using Group
Statistics to Sentence Individual Criminals: An Ethical and Statistical Critique of the Virginia
Risk Assessment Program, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 705–13 (2007) (assessing
the factors Virginia uses in its risk-assessment program, including, but not limited to,
age, marital status, employment status, prior criminal record, whether the offender
acted alone when committing a particular crime, and whether the offender was incarcerated as a juvenile).
100
For example, Historical, Clinical, Risk Management–20 (HCR–20) uses the following twenty factors in assessing the potential for violent behavior: (1) previous violence; (2) young age at first violent incident; (3) relationship instability; (4) employment problems; (5) substance abuse problems; (6) major mental illness; (7)
psychopathy; (8) early maladjustment; (9) personality disorder; (10) prior supervision failure; (11) lack of insight; (12) negative attitudes; (13) active symptoms of major mental illness; (14) impulsivity; (15) unresponsive to treatment; (16) plans lack
feasibility; (17) exposure to destabilizers; (18) lack of personal support; (19) noncompliance with remediation attempts; and (20) stress. Historical, Clinical, Risk Management–20
(HCR–20),
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
MEDICAL
DISORDERS,
http://www.minddisorders.com/Flu-Inv/Historical-Clinical-Risk-Management20.html (last visited May 23, 2011). See also MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK
ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001);
GEORGES-FRANCK PINARD, LINDA PAGANI, CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF DANGEROUSNESS:
EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (2001).
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“Early and Imminent Signs of Violent Behavior” refers to behaviors identified through empirical studies indicating whether an individual is reasonably likely to engage in violent conduct. “Early warning signs” are often used as a method by which to justify an initial
intervention, but for purposes of this statute, they shall not be sufficient to form the basis for involuntary confinement. Rather, there
must also be both: (1) direct and/or substantial causes of violent behavior and (2) behaviors/overt acts that suggest the commission of
violence in the immediate future. With respect to the “early and immediate signs of violent behavior,” the following non-exhaustive list
of factors shall be considered:
Early Warning Signs:
• Social withdrawal
• Excessive feelings of isolation and being alone
• Excessive feelings of rejection
• Being a victim of violence
• Feelings of being persecuted
• Uncontrolled anger
• Patterns of impulsive behavior
• Drug and alcohol use
• Access to or possession of firearms
• Threats of violence
• Physical fighting with peers or family members
• Destruction of property
• Self-injurious behavior, including suicidal ideation
• Anti-social behavior
• Head trauma
101
• Prior criminal record
Immediate Warning Signs:
• Severe rage episodes
• Repeated acts of aggression
• Detailed threats of lethal violence

101

U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. EARLY WARNING, TIMELY RESPONSE: A GUIDE TO SAFE
SCHOOLS (2005), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/osep/gtss.html (listing these and other factors); see also ASS’N OF THREAT ASSESSMENT PROF’LS, RISK
ASSESSMENT GUIDELINE ELEMENTS FOR VIOLENCE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASSESSING THE
RISK OF FUTURE VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (2006), available at http://downloads.
workplaceviolencenews.com/rage-v.pdf (listing these factors).
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• Possession of a detailed plan outlining when and where
violence is planned to occur
3.

EIPA § 1.1: Initial Confinement and Examination

Whoever, presents an immediate and/or foreseeable threat of
harm to himself or herself or others; has engaged in at least one overt
act of violence within the past thirty (30) days; presents at least two
factors known to be a direct or substantial cause of violent behavior;
and presents other factors known to be early and immediate signs of
violent behavior shall be confined, upon judicial determination, for a
period of at least forty-eight (48) hours but not more than seventytwo (72) hours. During this initial-confinement period, the appropriate professionals shall examine such individual and, using actuarial instruments, such as the HCR-20, PCL-R Revised, and Level of Service Inventory, such professional shall issue a recommendation
stating whether involuntary confinement beyond the aboveprescribed period is necessary. Subsequent to this recommendation,
the individual shall be entitled to release until such time as a hearing
is held before a Court of Law, in which the State must demonstrate,
by clear and convincing evidence, that continued confinement is warranted. The hearing shall occur no later than seventy-two (72) hours
after the initial recommendation by the relevant professional examiners.
4.

EIPA § 1.2: The Hearing to Determine Whether
Continued Confinement is Warranted

At such hearing concerning whether an individual should be
subject to confinement beyond the period prescribed in § 1.1, the
State has the initial burden of producing specific evidence demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual possesses an immediate and/or foreseeable threat to harm himself or
herself or others. The State’s evidence shall include, but will not
necessarily be limited to, expert testimony explaining why, on the basis of prior actuarial assessments (e.g., the HCR-20), continued confinement is warranted. More specifically, the State shall set forth,
based upon actuarial instruments, the particular factors that render
the individual an immediate and/or foreseeable threat to himself or
herself or others. The State shall then have the additional burden of
articulating a specific and individualized treatment plan (i.e., behavioral therapy and/or a medication regimen that is related to the
purposes justifying the individual’s continued confinement). The
State shall also specify the time period within which such treatment
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plan is likely to be successful and endeavor to select the shortest time
period possible.
The individual for whom confinement is sought has the right to
an attorney—paid for by the State if the individual is indigent—and
any witnesses to testify on his or her behalf that such individual does
not represent an immediate and/or foreseeable danger to himself or
herself or others and/or that such individual has sufficient support
among family, friends, and others that shall deem confinement unnecessary. The individual shall also have the right to present, at the
State’s expense, any experts who will testify that the individual is not
and does not present an immediate and/or foreseeable danger to the
community, and such individual shall also have access to all actuarial
and clinical instruments to support such contention.
5.

EIPA § 1.3: The Type of Confinement Warranted by
102
the Individual’s Threat Level

After hearing all of the evidence proffered by both parties, the
Court shall have the discretion to enter an Order either: (1) determining that continued confinement is not necessary because the individual does not satisfy the statutory factors governing involuntary
confinement; (2) stating that continued confinement is necessary because the individual represents, by clear and convincing evidence, a
threat to himself or herself or others, has engaged in at least one
overt act of violence in the last thirty (30) days, and is likely to commit a further act of violence in the immediate and/or foreseeable future; or (3) that the individual has sufficient support among family,
friends, and others such that an immediate and/or foreseeable act of
violence is not likely to occur. Based upon the Court’s determination
regarding the level of risk presented by the individual, the following
treatment options shall be available:
a.

EIPA § 1.3(a): Voluntary Commitment

At any time prior to or during the hearing, the individual may
knowingly, voluntarily, and willingly consent to a period of confinement in which the individual is subject to intervention and treatment.
This consent is conditioned upon the State detailing to the individual
the nature and purpose of confinement, the specific type of treatment he or she shall receive, and the estimated duration of confinement. Should the State fail to delineate any of these components to
the individual, informed consent cannot be valid as a matter of law.

102

See Parry, supra note 2, at 322–23 (detailing types of civil commitment).
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b.

EIPA § 1.3(b): Outpatient Commitment

After the plenary hearing in which the Court considers all evidence and determines the level and nature of risk presented by the
individual, it shall have within its discretion the authority to order the
individual to undergo an outpatient commitment program. The reasons underlying such decision may include, but are not limited to:
(1) the individual having a sufficient support structure (i.e., family,
friends, and others associated with the individual who can provide for
the individual’s basic needs and ensure his or her safety as well as that
of others); (2) the determination that the individual is not at risk to
commit a violent act in the immediate and/or foreseeable future; or
(3) the individual presenting an alternative, outpatient program that
the Court deems sufficient to ensure successful treatment by the least
restrictive means possible. Should outpatient treatment fail, however,
the State shall have within its authority the power to petition the
Court that in-patient treatment is necessary to address and treat the
individual’s violent proclivities.
c.

EIPA § 1.3(c): In-Patient Commitment

After a plenary hearing, if the Court determines that the individual poses an immediate and/or foreseeable threat to himself or
herself or others, it shall have the power to enter an Order authorizing the involuntary in-patient commitment of such individual. Such
decision, however, will be contingent upon a specific treatment plan
designed by the State detailing the procedural and substantive aspects that are intended to ensure a successful outcome within a particular time period.
6.

EIPA § 1.4: The Time Constraints and Procedures
Governing In-Patient Confinement

Should the State present clear and convincing evidence that the
individual poses an immediate and/or foreseeable threat to himself
or herself or others, the State shall, as stated above, specify an initial
time period—the first stage of confinement—within which it believes
it can successfully implement the particular treatment plan. In any
case, the State may not petition for the first stage of confinement of
any individual for a period exceeding thirty (30) days. The Court
shall then review the State’s evidence and independently set forth the
timeframe governing the first stage of confinement.
Thereafter, the State must reappear before the Court every fifteen (15) days to demonstrate that: (1) the individual is receiving the
treatment plan as outlined in its initial petition for confinement and
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(2) the individual’s treatment is proceeding successfully. If, however,
the State believes that an alternative treatment plan may be or is necessary, it must present to the Court, by clear and convincing evidence, why such treatment is necessary. At this hearing, the State
shall also inform the Court whether the individual is likely to be discharged after the initial thirty (30) day period or whether confinement after that period may be necessary. The procedures for extended confinement beyond the initial thirty (30) day period are set
forth in EIPA § 1.5.
At anytime during his or her confinement, the individual shall
have the opportunity to petition to the Court that: (1) confinement is
no longer necessary because such individual does not present an immediate and/or foreseeable risk to himself or herself or others; (2)
the State is not providing the individual with the specific treatment
plan that it proffered before the Court justifying the first thirty (30)
day stage of confinement; (3) the defendant has been treated to such
an extent that, with the support of family, friends, and others, he or
she is not an immediate and/or foreseeable harm to others; or (4)
there are lesser restrictive means (i.e., outpatient commitment) that
will be reasonably likely to result in a successful treatment outcome.
7.

EIPA § 1.5: Extended Confinement Beyond the First
Thirty (30) Day In-Patient Confinement Period

Prior to the expiration of the initial thirty (30) day period, the
State shall have the right to petition the Court that confinement
beyond the thirty (30) day period is necessary. Importantly, however,
the State may not base its justification upon the evidence used to
support the initial thirty (30) day confinement petition. The State
must adduce, by clear and convincing evidence, that continued confinement is necessary because, inter alia: (1) the individual’s treatment plan requires more time to ensure a successful outcome; (2)
the individual has not fully complied with the treatment plan, thus
necessitating an extended period to ensure a successful outcome; or
(3) the individual remains an immediate and/or foreseeable threat,
based upon new evidence, which justifies continued confinement.
At this hearing, the individual shall have the right to Stateappointed counsel as well as experts who may testify that continued
confinement is no longer necessary because, inter alia: (1) the treatment plan has been successful to a sufficient extent that the individual can live safely in the community and no longer represents an immediate and/or foreseeable harm to himself or herself or others or
(2) the treatment plan is not—or will not be—successful in assisting
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the individual and that alternative methods will be both available and
more effective.
8.

EIPA § 1.6: Maximum Term of In-Patient Confinement

In each case that concerns the involuntary confinement of an
individual, the maximum term within which such individual may be
confined shall not exceed ninety (90) days.
9.

EIPA § 1.7: Post-Release Procedures

After the individual is released from confinement, the State shall
have no authority to petition for that individual’s re-confinement unless new evidence emerges demonstrating that such individual: (1)
presents an immediate and/or foreseeable threat of harm to himself
or herself or others; (2) has engaged in at least one overt act of violence within the past thirty (30) days; or (3) presents at least two of
the factors known to be a direct or substantial cause of violent behavior and at least one additional factor known to be an early and immediate signs of violent behavior.
B. Objections to this Proposal
There are likely to be several objections to this proposal, based
upon both constitutional and workability grounds. These objections
are important and necessary because they directly influence how the
statute should be drafted, implemented, and administered. The two
primary objections to this proposal will be that: (1) confining an individual before the commitment of any criminal act violates an individual’s liberty interest under the Constitution, and (2) there is no
way to accurately predict whether an individual is likely to engage in
violent behavior, thus rendering confinement unworkable and de facto punitive.
1.

Involuntary Confinement of Individuals
Reasonably Likely to Engage in Immediate and/or
Foreseeable Acts of Violence Is Tantamount to
Confining an Individual Before Any Criminal Act Has
Been Committed

The first—and perhaps primary—objection to this proposal is
that it seeks to confine innocent individuals based upon a belief that
they will, at some point in the future, commit a criminal act. This
type of confinement not only violates an individual’s liberty interest
under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but also transgresses the very foundation upon which the depri-
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vation of liberty is founded—that an individual must engage in a
criminal act before confinement is warranted.
This argument has superficial appeal but fails when considered
in light of the current policies governing involuntary confinement.
First, involuntary in-patient confinement of the dangerous and mentally ill is already authorized in every state in the country. When confinement is ordered, such individuals have neither violated criminal
law nor engaged in overt acts indicating that they will commit acts of
violence in the imminent future. In fact, courts at the state level have
held that commitment of the dangerous and mentally ill is warranted
even where such individuals have committed no overt act whatsoever
103
indicating the propensity for violence.
To make matters worse,
many state statutes have dispensed with the requirement that the individual pose a threat of “imminent” harm and have instead authorized confinement, for example, where there exists a “substantial like104
lihood” that a violent act will occur in the near future.
Consequently, by requiring no overt act or imminent threat of
harm, these statutes emphasize and seek to confine those who have a
mental illness. This is particularly troubling because there is no direct causal relationship between mental illness and violent behavior.
The American penal system already confines people for reasons that
have nothing to do with violations of the law, at any time, or for any
reason. The current involuntary commitment statutes confine mentally ill individuals who present no harm whatsoever to themselves or
others.
The proposed statute, however, goes further in protecting an individual’s substantive and procedural due process rights. The individual must, based upon numerous factors including actuarial assessments and early and imminent warning signs that bear a causal
relationship to violent behavior, present a danger to himself or herself or others. The individual also must have engaged in at least one
overt act of violence within the past thirty days. Thus, the finding of
dangerousness is based more upon the facts of a particular case rather than upon predictions of or assumptions that an individual may
engage in a violent act.
Moreover, the State has a substantial burden to justify the first
and continued stages of confinement. The State must set forth a specific treatment plan that is likely to successfully rehabilitate the individual, and continued confinement past the initial thirty day period is

103
104

See supra Part II.C.2.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1) (West 2011).
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based solely upon the efficacy of the treatment and whether such
treatment either needs to be continued or altered to ensure a successful outcome. In this way, the statute is not punitive in nature. It
is rehabilitative and utilitarian because it strives to ensure proper
treatment and thus promote increased public safety.
Finally, at any time, the individual can petition the court for
immediate release or for a less restrictive means of confinement (i.e.,
an outpatient treatment plan). In any event, confinement can last no
longer than ninety days. Consequently, by focusing upon an individual’s behaviors (prior overt acts and warning signs directly linked to
criminal behavior), this proposal creates a much more solid basis
upon which to justify confinement. Furthermore, by excluding mental illness from this statute, it explicitly—and properly—recognizes
that mentally ill individuals are not inherently prone to violence.
The only instance in which a mentally ill individual should be confined is when the elements of the proposed statute are satisfied. If
the elements are satisfied, it will likely not be the result of a mental
illness but environmental and biological factors that warrant treatment.
2.

There Is No Method by Which to Accurately Predict
Whether an Individual Is Reasonably Likely to Engage
in Violent Behavior

Some may argue that there is no way to accurately predict
whether and individual is reasonably likely to engage in violent behavior. This argument is partially true but depends upon the tools that
are used to assess the likelihood of future dangerousness. For example, clinical evidence, namely the testimony of experts concerning
whether an individual is likely to engage in future acts of violence, is
notoriously unreliable. Expert testimony concerning future dangerousness is not very accurate. In 1983, in the context of long-term
sentencing, the American Psychiatric Association stated the following:
Psychiatrists should not be permitted to offer a prediction concerning the long-term future dangerousness in a capital case, at
least in those circumstances where the psychiatrist purports to be
testifying as a medical expert possessing predictive expertise in
this area . . . Medical knowledge has simply not advanced to the
point where long-term predictions . . . may be made with even
reasonable accuracy . . . [E]ven under the best of conditions, psy-
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chiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness are wrong
105
in at least two out of every three cases.

As one commentator explains, “peer-reviewed research . . . has
106
more recently bolstered these conclusions.” Specifically, “[m]ental
health professionals themselves are entirely skeptical of their own
predictions, [and] academics appear to have unanimously accepted
107
that such professionals are unreliable.” For example, a dangerousness prediction in the capital context has been described as “sobering, both in its inability to discriminate who will and will not engage
in violent misconduct in prison and in the minority who fulfill the
108
prediction.”
These studies reveal “low quality control for . . . dangerousness assertions and unreliability of the predictions in gener109
al.”
Furthermore, “more recent and more methodologically sound
studies indicate that mental health professionals are [only] moderate110
ly better than chance in predicting long-term dangerousness.”
Moreover, “[e]ven with extensive interviewing . . . studies show that
111
As a result, the
clinical predictions do not improve substantially.”
existing literature suggests that: (1) mental health practitioners’ future violence predictions are inaccurate; (2) they lack training in
making future dangerousness predictions; and (3) based upon a
number of factors, clinicians often overestimate rates of future vi112
olence.
Importantly, the proposed statute does not rely upon or even
utilize clinical testimony. Instead, it incorporates several instruments,
including the HCR-20, PCL-R, and Level of Service Inventory, which
contain factors that are known to accurately predict whether an indi113
vidual is likely to engage in violent behavior.
Furthermore, this
105

Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How “Future Dangerousness”
Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines the Rationale for the Executions It Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 161 (2008) (emphasis added).
106
Id. (citing Amicus Brief of the American Psychiatric Ass’n for Petitioner at 14,
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080), 1982 U.S. Briefs 6080 (1982)).
107
Id.
108
Mark D. Cunningham, Thomas J. Reidy, & Jon R. Sorensen, Assertions of “Future
Dangerousness” at Federal Capital Sentencing: Rates and Correlates of Subsequent Prison Misconduct and Violence, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 46, 61 (2008).
109
Shapiro, supra note 105, at 163.
110
Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing:
Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious Decision-Making, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 63, 85 (2005).
111
Id.
112
Id. at 86.
113
See supra note 99.
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proposal requires that, prior to confinement, an individual must engage in an overtly violent act, indicating a violence assessment that is
specific to the individual. The proposed statute, therefore, does not
use the types of unreliable clinical testimony that lie at the heart of
this argument and for that reason, the argument fails.
V. CONCLUSION
The massacre at Columbine could have, or at least may have,
been prevented if Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris were subjected to
state intervention and confinement based upon their likelihood of
engaging in immediate and foreseeable acts of violence. Klebold and
Harris created a website naming specific students that they wanted to
murder. They possessed and accumulated firearms. They drafted
stories of an extremely violent and horrific nature. These behaviors
did not merely suggest that they were planning on committing one of
the worst acts of school violence in our Nation’s history; they essentially broadcasted their plans to everyone and anyone who paid attention. However, if anyone in Colorado sought to involuntarily commit
either of these individuals, they would have had the unnecessary burden of demonstrating that Klebold and Harris were mentally ill.
Mental illness, however, is not causally related to violent behavior. It is likely that any attempts to confine them would have failed.
Under the proposed statute delineated above, they would have never
walked away from the courtroom. They would have been involuntarily confined in an in-patient setting. Similarly, Seung Hui Cho would
have been identified as an immediate danger to the community. His
confinement may have prevented the Virginia Tech tragedy. The
same holds true for other individuals who engage in acts of violence,
whether they are stalkers or those who engage in repeated acts of
domestic violence. We should not have to wait for forty-five students
to be killed in order to intervene. We can stop violence before it
happens, and we should begin to do so now.

